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IN RE K-DuR ANTITRUST LITIGATION:
PHARMACEUTICAL REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS Go
BEYOND THE "SCOPE OF THE PATENT"
Seiko F. Okada*
Reverse payment settlements occur in patent infringement suits by
innovative drug manufacturers against potential generic
manufacturers under the Hatch- Waxman Act, where the innovator
pays the generic and the latter agrees to delay market entry. Three
circuit courts have endorsed such settlements under the "scope of
the patent" ("SOP ") test. In In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation, the
Third Circuit rejected the SOP test, holding that reverse payment
settlements are presumptively illegal. Reverse payment settlements
typically involve monopoly sharing and warrant antitrust scrutiny.
K-Dur's presumptive illegality approach, as compared to the
extremely deferential SOP test, the over-inclusive per se approach,
or the prohibitively complex full "rule of reason" analysis, is the
best practicable judicial approach. Congress and the federal
agencies should implement policies to enhance public interest in
both a fair competitive market and innovative drug development.
I. INTRODUCTION
Developing an innovative drug is a risky investment.' Creating
a "new chemical entity" takes ten to fifteen years and costs more
than $1 billion.2 Additionally, the Food and Drug Administration
. J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2014. Ph.D.,
Medical Sciences (Cell Biology), University of Tokyo, 2007. M.D., University
of Tokyo, 1998. The author thanks Dr. Jeffrey Childers, Professor Andrew
Chin, Ms. Rebecca Crandall, and Mr. Charles Bentley for their insightful
guidance.
' U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-H-522, PHARMACEUTICAL
R&D: COSTS, RISKS, AND REWARDS, at iii (1993), available at http://www.fas.o
rg/ota/reports/9336.pdf.
2 Colleen Kelly, The Balance Between Innovation and Competition: The
Hatch- Waxman Act, the 2003 Amendments, and Beyond, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
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("FDA") approves only five of 5,000 drugs that begin preclinical
testing. A patent on an innovative drug has an important role in
encouraging innovative drug development 4 and incentivizing
studies of new indications or applications of already patented
drugs.5
After a patent has expired, or has been challenged and
invalidated, the patented product passes into the public domain.'
Upon FDA approval, a generic version of the same drug may be
produced and marketed by anyone.' While the FDA requires that a
generic drug have the same quality and efficacy as its innovative
counterpart,' some practical and substantive differences can exist
between generic and innovative drugs. First, a huge price
difference exists-the cost of a generic drug is about eighty to
eighty-five percent lower than its innovative counterpart on
average.' Secondly, inactive ingredients may differ between a
generic drug and its innovative counterpart.'o Thirdly, a generic
417, 418 (2011) (quoting FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 577
(3d ed. 2007)); see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. No 2589, RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 2, 19-22 (2006) (discussing
that, in 2000, developing an innovative drug of a new molecular entity took
about twelve years and cost more than $800 million, including expenditures on
failed projects and the value of forgone alternative investments).
3 Kelly, supra note 2, at 418.
4 See Pharmaceutical Patents: The Value of Pharmaceutical Patents &
Strong Intellectual Property Protection, INNOVATION.ORG 5, http://www.innovat
ion.org/documents/File/Pharmaceutical_Patents.pdf (last visited Dec. 27, 2012)
("[P]atents are a fundamental incentive to innovative activities in
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology." (internal citation omitted)).
5 See generally Henry Grabowski et al., Does Generic Entry Always Increase
Consumer Welfare?, 67 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 373 (2012) (discussing consumers'
interest in innovative drug development, including clinical studies of already
patented drugs for new use indications).
6 See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
7 See id.
8 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FACTS ABOUT GENERIC DRUGS, http://www.fda
.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/BuyingUsingMedicineSafely/Underst
andingGenericDrugs/ucm167991 .htm (last visited on Nov. 16, 2012).
9 Id.
'
0 Id. ("Generic drugs do not need to contain the same inactive ingredients as
the brand name product."). An inactive ingredient unique to a generic drug (or,
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drug and its innovative counterpart may look different-courts
have traditionally recognized an innovator's "trade dress" right that
the appearance of an innovative drug not be mimicked by others."
As much as consumers benefit when innovative drugs become
available, they also benefit when low-cost generic drugs become
available. The FDA estimates that the use of FDA-approved
generic drugs saved consumers $158 billion in 2010, an average of
$3 billion per week. 12 While cost is just one of several
considerations when choosing between innovative and generic
drugs," the availability of options is advantageous for consumers.
Congress intended to promote consumer benefits from generic
market entry as well as innovative drug development when it
conversely, an innovative drug) may cause side effects, including allergic
reactions. DEPRESSION AND BIPOLAR SUPPORT ALLIANCE, GENERIC AND BRAND
NAME DRUGS: UNDERSTANDING THE BASICS 4 (2007), available at www.dbsalli
ance.org/pdfs/GenericRx.pdf.
" Jeremy A. Greene et al., Why Do the Same Drugs Look Difjferent? Pills,
Trade Dress, and Public Health, 365 NEw ENG. J. MED. 83, 83-84 (2011). The
article discusses further that trade dress rights were historically recognized to
prevent the sale of counterfeit products. Id. In the modem context of innovative
and generic drugs, where the FDA approves only those generic drugs that have
efficacy equivalent to innovative counterparts, the article recommends a policy
to encourage similar appearances between innovative and generic drugs to
minimize consumers' confusion. Id. at 87-88.
12 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 8 (citing GENERIC
PHARMACEUTICAL ASS'N, SAVINGS: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF GENERIC
DRUG USAGE IN THE U.S. (2011), available at http://patentdocs.typepad.com/file
s/gpha-ims-study-web-sep20-1 .pdf). But see Grabowski, supra note 5, at 375-
82 (discussing that generic market entry may disadvantage consumers). Generic
market entry disincentivizes innovator drug companies from promoting their
innovative drugs with free sample distribution. Id. at 375-80. An innovative
drug with free samples may cost consumers less than a generic drug. Id.
Further, generic market entry may disincentivize an innovator drug company to
conduct costly clinical studies for new indications of the drug at issue because
the innovator drug company will no longer be able to gain enough profit from
the sales of the innovative drug to fund such clinical studies. Id. at 380-82.
'3 See DEPRESSION AND BIPOLAR SUPPORT ALLIANCE, supra note 10, at 6-7
(discussing other factors such as "medical histories, insurance, and personal
preferences").
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passed the Hatch-Waxman Act 4 in 1984.'" The Act was initially
successful in encouraging challenges for innovative drug patents
and, therefore, in facilitating generic market entry: Consumers
saved almost ten billion dollars from the introduction of generic
competition with Prozac (an antidepressant), Zantac (an antacid),
Taxol (an anti-cancer drug), and Plantinol (an anti-cancer drug) in
the 1990's alone.16 At the same time, however, the Hatch-Waxman
framework caused pharmaceutical companies to "game" this
complex statute to their benefit."
One of the major gaming activities was a "reverse payment
settlement" by an innovative drug company to its generic
challenger in patent challenge cases brought under the Hatch-
Waxman framework." The settlement payment, usually millions
of dollars, '9 flows from the plaintiff (patent holder) to the
14 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984); 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1984) (amending the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399) (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006)).
15 Kelly, supra note 2, at 421 (discussing the dual motivations of Congress to
encourage generic market entry and to encourage innovation and development
of new drugs); see H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 15-17 (1984), reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2648-50.
16 Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for
Presumptive Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REv. 37, 39 (2009) (citing Generic
Pharmaceuticals: Marketplace Access and Consumer Issues: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, & Transp., 107th Cong. 61 (2002)
(statement of Kathleen F. Jaeger, President and CEO, Generic Pharm. Ass'n),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-107shrg90155/pdf/CHRG-10
7shrg90155.pdf).
'7 Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory
Gaming, 87 TEX. L. REv. 685, 687, 709 (2009) (explaining that the very
regulatory structure that exists to promote competition can ironically create
gaming opportunities for competitors bent on achieving anticompetitive goals,
and that such "regulatory gaming" is particularly common in pharmaceutical
industries).
18 Carrier, supra note 16, at 51.
'9 See e.g., In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 205 (3d Cir. 2012)
(involving a reverse payment of $60 million over three years); In re Tamoxifen
Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 213 (2d Cir. 2006) (involving a reverse
payment of $21 million); Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 256
306 [VOL. 14: 303
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defendant (alleged patent infringer) "in reverse" of a regular
settlement, in return for delaying market entry of generic drugs. 20
A reverse payment settlement is distinct from a typical settlement
in that the settling parties share aligned incentives to create a
monopoly and share the monopoly deals at the expense of
consumers.21
Despite the anticompetitive nature of reverse payment
settlements, three circuit courts have held that such payments do
not violate antitrust law.22 These courts have used the "scope of
the patent" ("SOP") test, which essentially shields any reverse
payment settlement made within the scope of the patent from
antitrust scrutiny.23 By contrast, in the recent groundbreaking
F.3d 799, 804 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (involving four quarterly reverse payments
totaling $40 million).
20 Erica N. Andersen, Note, Schering the Market: Analyzing the Debate over
Reverse-Payment Settlements in the Wake of the Medicare Modernization Act of
2003 and In re Tamoxifen Citrate Litigation, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1015, 1024
(2008). A "pay-for-delay" settlement is a more descriptive naming of a reverse
payment settlement. Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Patent Law Analysis
of Pharmaceutical Reverse Payment Settlements 1 (Jan. 15, 2011) (unpublished
working paper) (on file with the University of Iowa College of Law), available
at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1741162.
21 Carrier, supra note 16, at 39-40 (articulating the aligned incentive for
monopoly, where the innovative company gains profits from delayed generic
entry and the generic company receives more money than it would gain by
entering the market).
22 See Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1315
(11th Cir. 2012); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d
1323, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 216.
23 See Watson, 677 F.3d at 1312 ("Our Valley Drug, Schering-Plough, and
Andrx decisions establish the rule that, absent sham litigation or fraud in
obtaining the patent, a reverse payment settlement is immune from antitrust
attack so long as its anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the
exclusionary potential of the patent." (footnote omitted)); Ciprofloxacin, 544
F.3d at 1336 ("The essence of the inquiry is whether the agreements restrict
competition beyond the exclusionary zone of the patent."); Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d
at 213 ("Unless and until the patent is shown to have been procured by fraud, or
a suit for its enforcement is shown to be objectively baseless, there is no injury
to the market cognizable under existing antitrust law, as long as competition is
restrained only within the scope of the patent."); see infra Part IlI.A.
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decision of In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation,2 4 the Third Circuit
rejected the widely-accepted SOP test and held that payment in
exchange for delayed market entry of generic drugs is
presumptively an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of
antitrust law.25
Reverse payment settlements are often monopoly agreements
that warrant antitrust scrutiny.26 In addition, a reverse payment
agreement does not seem to be essential for a mutually beneficial
settlement. 27 K-Dur's presumptive illegality approach, as
compared to the extremely deferential SOP test, the over-inclusive
per se approach,2 8 or the prohibitively complex full "rule of reason"
analysis,29 is the best and fairest practicable judicial approach.
This Recent Development argues that K-Dur's presumptive
illegality approach is the better judicial approach to reverse
payment settlements than the classical SOP test or other antitrust
standards. This Recent Development also discusses anticipated
social and economic impacts of the K-Dur decision, and advocates
for the role of Congress and the federal agencies, such as the FDA
and the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), in relevant
policymaking. Part II reviews the Hatch-Waxman framework and
a basic structure for antitrust scrutiny. Part III outlines the courts'
24 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012).
25 Id. at 218.
26 The economic effect of delayed generic market entry can be enormous. For
the twenty-one settlements with reverse payments that occurred between 1993
and 2008, "a one-year delay in generic entry represents, under conservative
assumptions, a transfer from consumers to manufacturers producers of at about
$14 billion." C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using
New Data and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
629, 650 (2009).
27 See Ian Hastings, Dynamic Innovative Inefficiency in Pharmaceutical
Patent Settlements, 13 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 31, 44 (2011) (discussing that a
settlement is traditionally far safer than trials for parties to a patent challenge
suit, which is often lengthy, expensive, and unpredictable); Carrier, supra note
16, at 74-75 (observing that reverse payments decreased when the FTC enforced
scrutiny and increased when circuit courts upheld reverse payment settlements);
infra notes 149-56 and accompanying text.
28 See infra Part IV.B.I.
29 See infra Part IV.B.2.
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approach to addressing reverse payment settlements prior to and in
the K-Dur decision. Part IV discusses the strengths of the K-Dur
approach over the SOP test or other antitrust inquiries. Finally,
Part V analyzes potential social and economic consequences of K-
Dur, and advocates that Congress, the FDA, and the FTC are in the
best position to ensure a fair pharmaceutical market while
encouraging innovative drug development through policymaking.
II. THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT AND THE STRUCTURE OF
ANTITRUST SCRUTINY
Pharmaceutical reverse payment settlements uniquely arose
under the Hatch-Waxman framework, so invoking the historic
tension between patent and antitrust law. ' To analyze debates
over reverse payment settlements, it is critical to understand the
Hatch-Waxman Act and the structure of antitrust scrutiny.
A. The Hatch- Waxman Act of 1984
To market an innovative drug, an innovator drug company
must file a New Drug Application ("NDA") with the FDA.32 The
NDA must address the following: detailed safety and efficacy
studies; the components of the drug; the method used in the
manufacture, process, and packaging of the drug; and patents
issued on the drug.33 Before the Hatch-Waxman Act, marketing of
a generic drug also required an NDA based on safety and efficacy
studies conducted independently from those of its bioequivalent
innovative drug." To avoid being sued for a patent infringement, a
generic company had to wait until the term of the innovative drug
patent expired before it started conducting studies on a generic
version."
30 See CHILTON DAVIS VARNER & ANDREW T. BAYMAN, REGULATION OF
PHARMACEUTICAL MFRS. § 4.02 8 (ALM Media Properties, LLC, 2012).
31 See Steven W. Day, Note, Leaving Room for Innovation: Rejecting the
FTC's Stance Against Reverse Payments in Schering-Plough v. FTC, 57 CASE
W. RES. L. REv. 223, 223 n.2 (2006).
32 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006).
33 Id. § 355(b)(1).
34 Andersen, supra note 20, at 1019.
35 id
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Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984 to "make
available more low cost generic drugs." " The Act allows a
manufacturer of a new generic drug to file an Abbreviated New
Drug Application ("ANDA") with the FDA." In an ANDA, a
generic, manufacturer must prove that the new drug is a
bioequivalent of an innovative drug on the market, but is exempt
from independent safety and efficacy studies as required for an
NDA.3 When a generic manufacturer files an ANDA, it is
required to certify that, to the best of the applicant's knowledge,
the proposed generic drug does not infringe any valid patent listed
with the FDA. 3 The generic manufacturer can satisfy this
requirement by certifying one of the four criteria with respect to
the patent for the listed drug:
(1) that such patent information has not been filed,
(II) that such patent has expired,
(Ill) of the date on which such patent will expire, or
(IV)that such patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the
manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the application
is submitted.40
Filing by a generic manufacturer of an ANDA with the paragraph
IV certification constitutes a technical act of patent infringement.4 1
Therefore, an innovator drug company (i.e., patent holder) may
initiate an infringement suit based on the filing of the paragraph IV
certification alone within forty-five days after the filing.42 If no
suit is brought during this period, the FDA may immediately
approve the ANDA application. If a suit is timely filed, an
automatic stay is granted, preventing the FDA from approving the
36 H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14- 15 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647-48.
3 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(1) (2006).
3 See id. § 355(2)(A).
39 Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).40 Id. Further, if there is more than one patent covering a drug, all of them
have to be invalidated for the ANDA filer to be successful in a paragraph IV
filing. See id.
41 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2006). Even though the generic has not yet
begun marketing its version of the drug, it has intent to market and infringe the
patent. Andersen, supra note 20, at 1020 & n.26.
42 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2006).
43 id
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generic drug: (1) for thirty months; or (2) until the court finds that
the challenged patent is either invalid or not infringed, whichever
is earlier.4 4
Multiple companies may file an ANDA for the same drug.45 A
180-day market exclusivity period, however, is awarded only to
the first filer of an ANDA with a paragraph IV certification.4 6
During the exclusivity period, the FDA will not approve any
subsequent ANDA applications for the drug, therefore, the first-
filer will be the only generic manufacturer that competes with the
innovative drug in the market.47
B. Amendment of the Hatch- Waxman Act in the Medicare
Modernization Act of 2003
Some pharmaceutical companies took advantage of the Hatch-
Waxman provisions for their anticompetitive benefits. In 2003,
Congress passed the Medicare Modernization Act ("MMA")4 8 to
amend the Hatch-Waxman Act and address such "regulatory
gaming." The MMA included the following three amendment
provisions.49
1. Only One Stay per ANDA
If a suit is timely filed in response to an ANDA with a
paragraph IV certification, an automatic stay of the ANDA
approval is granted, as discussed in Part II.A.so The original Act
did not limit the number of consecutive stays an innovator drug
company could invoke." After a generic manufacturer had filed an
ANDA and an automatic stay had been triggered, the innovator
drug company could list additional patents on the drug in the
4 Id.
45 See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
46 id.
47 Id.
48 Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, §§ 1111-1118,
117 Stat. 2066, 2461-64 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006)).
49 See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 17, at 687 (defining "regulatory gaming"
as anticompetitive activities of competitors gaming with loopholes of the very
regulatory structure aiming to promote competition).
5o Andersen, supra note 20, at 1020-21.
5' Id.
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Orange Book5 2 and trigger additional automatic stays." These
provisions led to abuse of the system by innovator drug companies,
who would file frivolous patents to stall generic entry. 4
In the MMA of 2003, Congress limited an innovator to one
stay per ANDA, and that stay only takes effect when an innovator
drug company alleges infringement of a patent already listed in the
Orange Book at the time of the ANDA filing."
2. A "Use It or Lose It" Provision for the 180-Day Market
Exclusivity Period
In the original Act, a 180-day market exclusivity period was
triggered either (1) when the first ANDA filer began marketing its
generic drug, or (2) when the court ruled for the ANDA filer in the
patent infringement suit, whichever is earlier. 56 The FDA
interpreted that the provision (2) is triggered only by a successful
ruling for the first-filer, but not a successful ruling by subsequent
ANDA filers. " If the first-filer and the innovator settled the
infringement suit and the first-filer did not bring its generic product
to market, neither trigger would start the first-filer's 180-day
exclusivity period. Accordingly, a subsequent filer of an ANDA is
prohibited from marketing its generic drug until after the first-
filer's exclusivity period has ended. Therefore, the settling first-
filer and innovator could effectively "bottleneck" the market by
preventing any other generic from selling the drug."
52 The Orange Book search is available electronically. See FED. DRUG
ADMIN., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE
EVALUATIONS, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/default.cfm (last
visited Nov. 17, 2012).
5 Andersen, supra note 20, at 1020-21.
54 Id. at 1021.
5 See id. (citing the Medicare Modernization Act at 2448-54). In 2003, the
FDA also limited the types of patents that a pioneer could list in the Orange
Book because certain classes of patents were being filed frivolously by
innovators. Id. at 1021 n.32.
56 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2006).
57 Andersen, supra note 20, at 1022 n.38.
58 "Bottlenecking" (slowing or stopping competition in a market) in the
Hatch-Waxman context refers to the practice of preventing all subsequent
generic entry by manipulating the 180-day exclusivity period. Id. at 1022 &
[VOL. 14: 303312
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In the MMA of 2003, Congress dropped the court-decision
trigger of provision (2) and implemented a "use it or lose it"59
regime."o The 180-day market exclusivity period is now triggered
solely by the first-filer's entry into the market; however, the first-
filer who does not market within a certain period will lose market
exclusivity." The first-filer must now market within seventy-five
days after the final approval of the ANDA or within thirty months
after filing the ANDA, whichever comes first.62 This amendment
would alleviate some of the bottlenecking problems.
n.39. "Bottlenecking" was at issue in Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Biovail
Corp., 256 F.3d 799 (D.C. Cir. 2001), and In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig.,
332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003). See infra note 86 and accompanying text. In
1998, the D.C. Circuit held that provision (2) can be triggered by a successful
infringement suit by subsequent filers, not only the first-filer. See Andersen,
supra note 20, at 1022 (discussing Mova Pharm Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060
(D.C. Cir. 1998)). Therefore, another generic manufacturer could challenge the
patent and trigger the first-filer's market exclusivity period to run. Id. This
holding partially alleviated the bottlenecking. Id.
See Carrier, supra note 16, at 48.
6o 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006); see Carrier, supra note 16, at 47-48.
61 See 21 U.S.C. § 355.
62 Id. The MMA further provides that as long as the first-filer "lawfully
maintained" its paragraph IV certification, such as by litigating the infringement
suit to the end, it may maintain the exclusivity period. Id.
See Carrier, supra note 16, at 49. A close reading of the "use it or lose it"
statutory amendment, however, reveals that it may not necessarily trigger
forfeiture of a market exclusivity period when the ANDA first filer does not
"use it." See id. at 48. The forfeiture provisions provide that the first-filer will
lose exclusivity if it:
[F]ails to market the drug by the later of-
(aa) the earlier of the date that is-
(AA) 75 days after the date on which the approval of the application of the
first applicant is made effective . .. ; or
(BB) 30 months after the date of submission of the application of the first
applicant; or
(bb) ... the date that is 75 days after the date as of which . . . at least I of
the following has occurred:
(AA) In an infringement action . .. a court enters a final decision . . . that
the patent is invalid or not infringed.
(BB) In an infringement action ... a court signs a settlement order or
consent decree that enters a final judgment that includes a finding that the
patent is invalid or not infringed.
FALL 2012] 313
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3. Antitrust Review by the Federal Trade Commission and the
Department ofJustice
Soon after Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act, innovator
and generic pharmaceutical companies started to settle the Hatch-
Waxman patent infringement suits by reverse payment
settlements."' With a reverse payment settlement, an innovator
drug company may exclude competition and enjoy exclusive
marketing of the innovative drug, while a generic drug
manufacturer enjoys more financial gain than it would have had by
marketing its generic drug in the agreed market-delay period.
Concerned about the possible anticompetitive effects of reverse
payment settlements, Congress amended the Hatch-Waxman Act
in the MAA of 2003 to require that pharmaceutical companies file
patent litigation settlement agreements with the FTC and the
Department of Justice for antitrust review.66
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I). The "use it or lose it" provision, codified in (aa),
will trigger forfeiture of the exclusivity period only when they occur later than
the (bb) triggers. Therefore, the parties can bottleneck the market when the (bb)
triggers do not occur, that is, until an ANDA-filer wins in court. If no ANDA
filer wins against the innovator in court, either through a judicial decision or a
settlement, the (bb) triggers do not take place, and the forfeiture will not be
triggered. See Anticompetitive Patent Settlements in the Pharmaceutical
Industry: The Benefits of a Legislative Solution: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, I10th Cong., at 9 (2007) (statement of Jon Leibowitz,
Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibow
itz/070117anticompetitivepatentsettlementssenate.pdf ("[A]lthough a first-filer
can forfeit its exclusivity under certain conditions, ordinarily it will be entitled
to 180 days of exclusivity."); Carrier, supra note 16, at 48-49; Hastings, supra
note 27, at 41-43; Andersen, supra note 20, at 1024.
64 See Carrier, supra note 16, at 48-49.
65 Id.
66 Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, §§ 1111-1118,
117 Stat. 2066, 2461-64 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006)). If
the FTC or Attorney General subsequently files an antitrust complaint and a
court finds for the antitrust plaintiff, the defendant first ANDA filer may lose its
180-day market exclusivity period. Id.
314 [VOL. 14: 303
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C. Structure ofAntitrust Scrutiny
Courts scrutinize commercial practices under the Sherman
Act67 to determine whether the questioned practice imposes an
unreasonable restraint on trade.68 The following three antitrust
standards are commonly used.
1. The "Rule ofReason" Analysis
The general approach is the "rule of reason" analysis.69 This
antitrust inquiry consists of three parts. 70 First, the antitrust
plaintiff must show that the challenged conduct has produced
anticompetitive effects within the market." Second, if the plaintiff
meets the initial burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to show
that the questioned conduct offers a pro-competitive objective.72
Finally, the plaintiff may rebut the defendant's justification by
showing that the restraint was not reasonably necessary to achieve
the pro-competitive objective. " The rule of reason analysis
requires a weighing of all the relevant circumstances of a case,
including market power, the structure of the market, specific
information about the relevant business, and the history, nature,
and effect of the restraint. 7" A thorough investigation of the
industry under review and a balancing of the restraint's positive
and negative effects on competition are required."
2. The Per Se Rule
Courts have recognized that "[s]ome types of restraints
have such predictable and pernicious anticompetitive effect, and
such limited potential for pro-competitive benefit, that they [should
67 15 U.S.C. § 1(2006).
68 See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997).
69 d
70 d
71 U. S. v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993).
72 Id. at 669.
7 Id.
74 id.
7 THOMAS V. VAKERICS, ANTITRUST BASICS § 1.03, at 1-3 (ALM Media
Properties, LLC, 2012).
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be] deemed unlawful per se."7 6 Unlawful practices under the per
se rule include horizontal price fixing, output limitations, market
allocation, and group boycotts." "[T]o condemn a restraint as per
se illegal, the courts must have had sufficient experience with the
particular type of restraint to be able to predict . . . the rule of
reason would also condemn the same restraint.""
3. The " 'Quick Look' Rule ofReason Analysis"
The " 'quick look' rule of reason analysis"o is an intermediate
standard of antitrust analysis in between the full "rule of reason"
inquiry and the per se approach. A "quick look rule of reason"
inquiry is applied where the plaintiff has shown that the defendant
has engaged in practices similar to those subject to per se
treatment.8' Having so shown, a plaintiff is not required to make a
full showing of anticompetitive effects within the market. Rather,
the defendant has the burden of demonstrating pro-competitive
justifications.8
III. JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO REVERSE PAYMENT
SETTLEMENTS
The FTC has consistently struck down reverse payment
settlements as an unreasonable restraint of trade, and therefore a
violation of antitrust law." Some pharmaceutical companies have
appealed the FTC decisions to the district courts.84 Apart from the
76 In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997)).
n See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 209 (citing Copperweld Corp. v. Independence
Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).
78 VAKERICS, supra note 75, at 6.
79 Id. at 4.
80
81 United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 1993).
82 id
83 See e.g., In re Schering-Plough Corp., 136 F.T.C. 956, 1052, 1056-57
(2003).
84 When the FTC brings antitrust suit against an entity, it is first adjudicated
by an administrative law judge, followed by the FTC's final decision. See 15
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FTC, direct and indirect purchasers of drugs also brought antitrust
suit against pharmaceutical companies." Approaches of courts to
reverse payment settlements are discussed in this Part.
A. Judicial Approaches to Reverse Payment Settlements Prior to
K-Dur
Circuit courts are divided on the issue of whether reverse
payment settlements are an unreasonable restraint of trade. First
two circuit court decisions sided with the FTC. In 2001, the
Federal Circuit held that "bottlenecking" 86 was prima facie
evidence of an illegal agreement not to compete." In 2003, the
Sixth Circuit held that an agreement to not only delay market entry
of the drug under patent challenge, but also other drugs, was a
horizontal agreement to eliminate competition and a per se illegal
restraint of trade.88
U.S.C. § 45 (2006). The case can subsequently be appealed to a district court,
then to a circuit court. See id.
85 These cases are brought directly to a district court. See, e.g., In re K-Dur
Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 207 (3d Cir. 2012) (Forty-four wholesalers and
retailers joined as antitrust plaintiffs.); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332
F.3d 896, 896 (6th Cir. 2003) (The suit was brought by indirect and direct
purchasers.).
86 See supra note 58 for a discussion of bottlenecking. The Andrx decision
was adopted in the K-Dur decision, although K-Dur, unlike Andrx, did not
involve bottlenecking:
In holding that a reverse payment is prima facie evidence of an
unreasonable restraint of trade, we follow the approach suggested by the
DC Circuit in Andrx and embrace that court's common sense conclusion
that "[a] payment flowing from the innovator to the challenging generic
firm may suggest strongly the anticompetitive intent of the parties entering
the agreement .... "
K-Dur at 218 (quoting Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int'l., 256 F.3d 799,
809 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). See infra Part 111.B for a discussion of the K-Dur
decision.
8 Andrx, 256 F.3d at 803.
88 In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d at 911; see Michael A.
Carrier, Why the "Scope of the Patent" Test Cannot Solve the Drug Patent
Settlement Problem, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 2 (2012) (discussing that the
Cardizem court applied the SOP test and found that the agreement to delay
market entry of drugs uncovered by the patent was outside of the scope of the
patent).
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By contrast, recent decisions have upheld reverse payment
settlements.89 The Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits applied
the SOP test.9 0 The SOP test asks "whether the agreements restrict
competition beyond the exclusionary zone of the patent." A
patent grants rights to exclusively produce and market the patented
product.92 Therefore, the SOP test finds no violation of antitrust
law "as long as competition is restrained only within the scope of
the patent," 93 unless the patent is procured by fraud or the patent
enforcement suit is objectively baseless. 9 The SOP test,
presuming a patent to be valid even if its validity is being
challenged, typically provides that an anticompetitive settlement
agreement for a Hatch-Waxman patent challenge suit is within the
scope of the patent. 95 The policies underlying the SOP test include:
(1) reasonable implementation of the protections afforded by
89 Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Watson Pharms, Inc. 677 F.3d 1298, 1315 (1lth Cir.
2012); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1341
(Fed. Cir. 2008); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 216 (2d
Cir. 2006).
90 See supra text accompanying note 23.
9' Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1336.
92 Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 213-16.
9 Id. at 213 (citation omitted).
94 See Watson, 677 F.3d at 1312 (holding that the SOP test applies "absent
sham litigation or fraud in obtaining a patent"); Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 213
(holding that the SOP test applies "[u]nless and until the patent is shown to have
been procured by fraud, or a suit for its enforcement is shown to be objectively
baseless"); see also California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404
U.S. 508, 511, 515-16 (1972) (holding that a litigant seeking to protect a patent
in court will be liable under antitrust law only when the litigation is a mere sham
used to cover up anticompetitive agreement).
95 See Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 190, 213-16 (upholding a reverse payment
settlement under the SOP test, presuming that the patent was valid, even though
the District Court held in the underlying patent challenge suit that the patent was
invalid); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1306-09
(11th Cir. 2003) (upholding a reverse payment settlement under the SOP test,
even though the patent at issue was subsequently declared invalid in another
case, because the innovator manufacturer "might have prevailed" in the
underlying patent suit).
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patent law; and (2) a judicial policy favoring settlement to
litigation.9 6
B. Facts, Holding, and Reasoning in K-Dur
In K-Dur, the drug at issue was K-Dur 20, a sustained-release
potassium chloride supplement manufactured and marketed by the
Schering-Plough Corporation.9 7 Schering held a formulation patent
on the controlled release coating." The patent was set to expire on
September 5, 2006.99
In August 1995, Upsher-Smith Laboratories, a pharmaceutical
company, filed the first ANDA with a paragraph IV certification
seeking FDA approval to produce a generic version of K-Dur 20.1'0
In December 1995, another company, ESI Lederle, filed an ANDA
with a paragraph IV certification similarly seeking to manufacture
a generic version of K-Dur 20.'O' Schering timely filed a patent
infringement suit in response to each company's paragraph IV
certification.'0 2 Subsequently, Schering settled with Upsher and
ESI, respectively." In the Schering-Upsher deal entered into in
June 1997, Schering paid Upsher $60 million." Upsher, in return,
agreed to refrain from marketing its generic version of K-Dur 20
until September 1, 2001 (for approximately four years), at which
point Upsher would receive a royalty-free, non-exclusive license
under the Schering patent.' In the Shering-ESI deal entered into
96 See Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1306-09, 1312.
97 1n re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 203 (3d Cir. 2012). After the
facts at issue in this case, Merck & Co. acquired Schering and is the named
defendant in this case. Id. at 203. In keeping with the practice of the parties and
amici, however, the court will refer to Schering. Id.
98 Id. at 203. Schering did not hold a patent for K-Dur 20's active ingredient
(potassium chloride), which is a commonly known unpatentable compound. Id.
99 Id.
'00 Id. at 205.
'o' Id. at 206.
102 Id. at 205-06.
103 id
'0 Id. at 205.
'os Id. at 205-06. Additionally, Upsher granted Schering licenses to make and
sell several pharmaceutical products of Upsher, which were mutually abandoned
after the settlement. Id.
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in the fall of 1996, Schering paid ESI $5 million up front and
agreed to pay a varying sum depending on when ESI's ANDA
would be approved by the FDA, eventually paying an additional
sum of $10 million.'0 6 ESI agreed to refrain from marketing its
generic version of K-Dur 20 until January 1, 2004 (for
approximately seven years), at which point ESI would receive a
royalty-free license under the Schering patent.'o
In 2001, the FTC brought an action against Schering, Upsher,
and ESI alleging violations of section 5 of the FTC Act. '
Specifically, the FTC alleged that the settlement payments from
Schering to Upsher and ESI constituted reverse payments intended
to improperly delay generic market entry and preserve a
monopoly. "o' The administrative law judge ruled in favor of
Schering, Upsher, and ESI."0 In 2003, the FTC reversed, holding
that "the quid pro quo for the payment was an agreement by the
generic [companies] to defer entry beyond the date that represents
an otherwise reasonable litigation compromise.""' In 2005, the
Eleventh Circuit reversed the FTC under the SOP test. 112
Subsequently, antitrust suits by various private parties attacking
the settlements were consolidated in the District of New Jersey,
106 Id. at 206. The agreement was arranged so that the sooner the FDA would
approve ESI's ANDA, the more Schering would pay ESI in return for ESI's
withholding market entry of its generic K-Dur 20 until an agreed time. Id. The
FDA approved ESI's generic K-Dur 20 product in May 1997, two and one-half
years after the settlement. Id. Schering paid ESI an additional $10 million,
while ESI withheld market entry of a generic version of K-Dur 20 for an
additional four and one-half years (until January 1, 2004) as required under the
agreement. Id.
107 id.
108 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006); K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 206-07.
109 In re Schering-Plough Corp., 136 F.T.C. 956, 1092-93 (2003).
'ld at 1236, 1243, 1262-63.
" Id. at 988.
112 Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1069-72 (1lth Cir. 2005)
(holding that Schering's payment to Upsher was only for the licenses and that
Schering's payment to ESI was a reverse payment legitimately within the scope
of the patent).
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which upheld the settlements."' The case was appealed from the
District of New Jersey to the Third Circuit."'
The Third Circuit reversed the district court on the ground that
"a reverse payment is prima facie evidence of an unreasonable
restraint on trade.""' The Third Circuit rejected the SOP test and,
on remand, directed the district court to apply the "quick look rule
of reason" antitrust analysis 116 based on the anticompetitive
realities of reverse payment settlements rather than the labels
applied by the settling parties." 7 The court stated that prima facie
evidence of an unreasonable restraint on trade could be rebutted
"by showing that the [reverse] payment (1) was for a purpose other
than delayed entry or (2) offers some pro-competitive benefit.""'
The merits of the underlying patent suit need not be considered."I
The Third Circuit presented four reasons for its rejection of the
SOP test. 120 First, the court disputed the "almost unrebuttable
presumption of patent validity" of the SOP test. 121 A patent
"simply represents a legal conclusion reached by the Patent
Office," 122 and an irrefutable presumption of patent validity is
unfounded. 123 In fact, statistics demonstrate that challengers
" K-Dur, 686 F.3d, 207-08. Eventually forty-four wholesalers and retailers
joined as plaintiffs. Id. at 208.
114 Id. at 208.
"' ld. at 218.
116 See supra Part IL.C for a discussion of the "quick look rule of reason"
analysis.
"' K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218.
118 Id. For the second possible defense, the patent holder may rebut the prima
facie case by demonstrating that the reverse payment offers a competitive
benefit that could not have been achieved without reverse payment, for example,
to save a generic manufacturer from bankruptcy so that it can market a generic
drug to eventually facilitate competition. Id.
119 Id.
12 0 Id. at 214-18.
121 Id. at 214-15.
122 Id. at 215 (quoting Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969)).
123 Id. at 215. In patent validity challenge cases, a patent is "presumed valid,"
and the challenger bears the burden of defeating a presumption of validity. 35
U.S.C. § 282 (2006). On the other hand, in patent infringement cases, the patent
holder bears the burden of showing infringement. See id. § 295 (2006)
(establishing burden shifting from infringement plaintiff to defendant in certain
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prevail at overwhelming rates in patent challenge suits-according
to data from the FTC, generic challengers prevailed in seventy-
three percent of the Hatch-Waxman paragraph IV patent challenge
cases. 124
Second, the court rejected an assumption that subsequent
patent challenges by other generic manufacturers will suffice to
eliminate weak patents preserved through a reverse payment to the
initial challenger.125 The court pointed out that subsequent generic
challengers are not as motivated as the initial generic challenger,
who stands alone to benefit from the 180-day market exclusivity
period.126 In addition, the patent holder also may pay off a whole
series of generic challengers to delay market entry.'2 7
Third, the court noted the Supreme Court's recognition that
valid patents are a limited exception to a general rule of the free
exploitation of ideas, and that public interest supports judicial
testing and elimination of weak patents. 28 The Supreme Court has
held that it is of broad public interest to free "our competitive
situations as to process patents); Julie E. Zink, Shifting the Burden: Proving
Infringement and Damages in Patent Cases Involving Inconsistent
Manufacturing Techniques, 2 HASTINGS SC. AND TECH. L.J. 81, 82-84
(explaining common law and statutory presumption of patent non-infringement
and subsequent burden shifting in certain situations). The presumption of patent
validity or non-infringement is merely a procedural device and is not a
substantive right of parties. See Michael A. Carrier, Solving the Drug Settlement
Problem: The Legislative Approach, 41 RUTGERS L. J. 83, 85-86 & n.l 1
(2009); infra Part IV.A.
124 K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 215 n.11; see FED. TRADE COMM'N, GENERIC DRUG
ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION 16 (2002), available at http://www.ftc.go
v/os/2002/07/genericrugstudy.pdf. According to data from the pharmaceutical
industry, generic challengers prevailed in slightly less than half of the Hatch-
Waxman patent litigation in 2000-09. Further, when cases that are settled and
dropped are taken into consideration in the same data set, generic challenger
prevailed in seventy-six percent of their challenges. RBC CAPITAL MKTS.,
PHARMACEUTICALS: ANALYZING LITIGATION SUCCESS RATES 4 (2010),
available at http://www.amlawdaily.typepad.com/pharmareport.pdf
125 K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 215.
126 Id
127 Id. In fact, Schering bought out both Upsher (the initial generic
challenger) and ESI (a subsequent generic challenger). Id. at 205-06.
1281 d. at 215-16.
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economy from the trade restraints which might be imposed by
price-fixing agreements stemming from narrow or invalid
patents"'2 9 and "the right to challenge [a patent] is not only a
private right to the individual, but it is founded on public policy
which is promoted by his making the defense, and contravened by
his refusal to make it."'3 0 Therefore, the court argued, the Supreme
Court would not tolerate reverse payment settlements that "permit
the sharing of monopoly rents between would-be competitors
without any assurance that the underlying patent is valid.""'
Lastly, the court noted that the SOP test "nominally protects
intellectual property, not on the strength of a patent holder's legal
rights, but on the strength of its wallet."'3 2 The nature of the SOP
test is against the Congressional intent underlying the Hatch-
Waxman Act. By passing the Act, Congress aimed to encourage
generic challenges against innovator pharmaceutical companies
and to increase the availability of low-cost generic drugs for
consumers.1
For all of these reasons, the court rejected the SOP test.
Further, the court held that reverse payment settlements are
presumptively illegal. 1' Although the court raised thorough
reasons for rejecting the SOP test, the court opinion is not explicit
as to why the court replaced the SOP test with the "quick look rule
of reason" analysis and presumed the reverse payment settlements
illegal. The advantage of the K-Dur's "quick look rule of reason"
approach is analyzed in Part IV.B.
129 Id at 216 (quoting Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chi. Metalic Mfg. Co., 329
U.S. 394, 400 (1947)).
130 Id. (quoting Kartzinger, 329 U.S. at 401).
' Id at 215-16 (citing Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc, 508 U.S. 83,
100-01 (1993); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thundercraft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,
146 (1989); United States v. Mansonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 277 (1942)).
132 Id. at 217; see C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical
Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553,
1614 (2006).
'13 K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 217.
'
34 Id. at 218.
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IV. WHY THE K-DuR DECISION IS THE BEST PRACTICABLE
JUDICIAL APPROACH
Three circuit courts have applied the SOP test to reverse
payment settlements.' The Third Circuit rejected the SOP test in
K-Dur, thereby creating a stark split among circuits.136 This Part
analyzes why the K-Dur approach to reverse payment settlements
is superior to, and more practicable than, the SOP test or other
potential alternative approaches.
A. Rejecting the "Scope of the Patent" Test
A central issue to the circuit split is weighing how much a
patent ought to protect an innovator drug company from
competition-a classical issue of balancing the encouragement of
innovation with promotion of competition.'3
Applying the SOP test to reverse payment settlements is
questionable for legal and economic reasons. First, the SOP test
incorrectly presumes that every patent is valid.'38 Even though a
patent is procedurally "presumed valid" in suits over patent
validity, 13' an overwhelming number of patents have been
invalidated in Hatch-Waxman patent challenge suits. 140 If the
patent is not valid, no scope that protects the patent holders should
exist. 141
Moreover, based on this presumptive validity approach, suits
over patent infringement would fall outside of the scope of the
135 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
136K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218.
137 See Day, supra note 31, at 223 n.2, 258-59 (discussing a longstanding
inherent conflict of patent and antitrust laws, where patent law allows innovators
to control output and prices, while antitrust law prohibits activities to control
output and prices).
138 See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214; Carrier, supra note 16, at 62-63.
139 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006). This presumption that a challenged patent is valid
is a procedural device and is not a substantive right of a patent holder. See
Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1983); supra
note 123 and accompanying text.
140 See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
141 Andersen, supra note 20, at 1054.
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patent. 4 2 For example, in K-Dur, Upsher and ESI alleged, in their
paragraph IV certification, that they did not infringe Schering's
patent.143 In a patent validity case, the patent is presumed valid and
the challenger bears the burden of demonstrating invalidity; by
contrast, in a patent infringement case, the patent is presumed not
infringed and the patent holder bears the burden of demonstrating
infringement.14 4 The SOP test maintains that an agreement to delay
market entry of a generic version of a patented product falls within
the scope of the presumptively valid patent.'45 Applying the same
logic, a settlement to delay market entry of a product which
presumptively has no infringement problem will fall outside of the
scope of the patent, contrary to the Eleventh Circuit decision in
Schering.'46
Second, the SOP test's tremendous deference to patent holders
is problematic in economic terms. Legal and economic scholars
have warned of anticompetitive characteristics of reverse payment
settlements,'47 a factor that the SOP test does not consider. The
FTC estimates that the savings to purchasers of drugs that would
result from eliminating reverse payment settlements would be at
142 Carrier, supra note 88, at 7.
" K-Dur, 686 F.3d. at 205-06; see Carrier, supra note 88, at 7 (discussing
that Upsher and ESI's noninfringement claims were plausible because
Schering's patent did not cover the active ingredient of K-Dur 20, but covered
the coating material); see also supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing
Schering's K-Dur 20 patent).
144 See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
145 See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 212-13 (2d Cir.
2005).
146 Schering-Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 344 F.3d 1294, 1072 (11th
Cir. 2003) (holding the settlement terms between Schering and ESI "to be within
the patent's exclusionary power, and reflect a reasonable implementation of the
protections afforded by patent law" (internal quotation omitted)).
147 See Carrier, supra note 123, at 90 ("Of all the types of business activity,
agreements by which competitors divide markets lead to the most extreme
anticompetitive effects because they restrict all competition between the parties
on all grounds."); Hemphill, supra note 132, at 1593-94 (analyzing aligned
incentives of the innovator and generic drug companies in reverse payment
settlements).
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least 3.5 billion dollars annually.'48 Moreover, a reverse payment
does not seem to be an essential deal for settling parties to make.
Data demonstrate that nearly seventy-five percent of Hatch-
Waxman Act infringement suits that settled in 2010 did so without
reverse payments. 14 The data illustrates that both an innovator
drug company and a generic challenger have incentives to settle a
Hatch-Waxman patent infringement suit even without reverse
payment-to avoid the risk of unpredictable outcome of litigation
and to reach at mutually agreeable result faster and cheaper.'s
Other data demonstrate that reverse payment settlements
decreased when challenged and increased when upheld by the
courts. '5' Between 1992 and 1999, eight of the fourteen final
settlements between innovative and generic companies involved
reverse payments. 5 2 In 2000, the FTC announced enforcement of
antitrust scrutiny on reverse payment settlements.' Between 2000
and 2004, none of the twenty reported agreements involved a
reverse payment. 1' Following decisions by the Second and
Eleventh Circuits upholding reverse payment settlements,' such
deals re-appeared and increased. Three out of eleven, fourteen out
of twenty-eight, and fourteen out of thirty-three Hatch-Waxman
148 FED. TRADE COMM'N, PAY-FOR-DELAY: How DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS
COST CONSUMERS BILLIONS 8 (2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
2010/01/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf.
149 FED. TRADE COMM'N, BUREAU OF COMPETITION, AGREEMENTS FILED
WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION
DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003: OVERVIEW OF
AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2010, at 2 (2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/2011/05/1105mmagreements.pdf.
Iso Hastings, supra note 27, at 53-54.
1s1 Carrier, supra note 16, at 74-75.
I52 id.
'5 Id. at 75 (citing Abbott Laboratories, and Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.;
Analysis to Aid Public Comment, 65 Fed. Reg. 17,502, 17,506 (Fed. Trade
Comm'n Apr. 3, 2000) (notice).
1s4 Carrier, supra note 16, at 75.
15 See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 197, 216 (2d Cir.
2006); Schering-Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 402 F.3d 1056, 1072
(11th Cir. 2005).
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settlements that took place in 2005, 2006, and 2007, respectively,
included reverse payment.15 1
In sum, the SOP test allows a patent holder to "buy its way out
of' both fair competition and possible patent invalidation,' 7 and
permits a generic challenger to share the monopoly rents.' The
Third Circuit correctly held that the SOP test provides an unjust
advantage to innovator and generic drug companies.'5 9 Rejection
of the SOP test in the K-Dur decision 6 0 is a significant victory for
the public interest in the creation of a fair and competitive
pharmaceutical market.
B. Moving Beyond the "Scope of the Patent" Test: K-Dur's
"Quick Look Rule ofReason " Analysis
The K-Dur court replaced the SOP test with a "quick look rule
of reason" analysis.' 6' The court's decision to apply this analysis
highlights the court's view that reverse payment settlements are by
nature similar to transactions that are held to be per se unlawful,
such as horizontal price fixing.'62 Given the potential pernicious
anticompetitive effect of reverse payment settlements,'6 3 this view
is reasonable. Comparing the K-Dur's "quick look rule of reason"
approach with other possible antitrust analysis, as discussed in this
i5 See Carrier, supra note 16, at 75.
In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 215 (3d Cir. 2012).
158 See id. at 216; Carrier, supra note 16, at 39 (discussing parties' aligned
incentives for reverse payment settlements).
1 See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214-18. But see Day, supra note 31, at 257-61
(advocating that reverse payment settlements should be permitted as innovators'
rights within the scope of the patent to encourage pharmaceutical innovation and
promote a long-term consumer welfare).
160 Id. at 214.
161 See id. at 218; supra Part II.C (discussing a "quick look rule of reason"
analysis). Under a "quick look rule of reason" analysis, K-Dur held that reverse
payment settlements established a presumption of unreasonable restraint on
trade, whereas a full "rule of reason" analysis would have conducted a detailed
fact-specific analysis. K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218. Similarly, K-Dur placed the
burden on antitrust defendants to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness,
whereas a full "rule of reason" analysis would have first placed a burden on the
antitrust plaintiff to establish unreasonableness. See id.
162 See supra Part II.C (discussing the per se rule of antitrust analysis).
163 See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
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Part, reveals why the K-Dur approach is the best practicable
judicial approach.
1. The Per Se Rule
Holding that reverse payment settlements are per se illegal
would over-punish the settling parties for two reasons. First,
courts may not have had sufficient experience with reverse
payment settlements to "decisively predict that the 'rule of reason'
analysis also would condemn" them. '" In such cases, courts
should not apply the per se rule. 165 Second, reverse payment
settlements may not always be a per se unreasonable restraint on
trade. The reverse payment may possibly be for something other
than a delay in market entry, such as for legitimate side deals.'66
Alternatively, even when payment was indeed for delay in market
entry, it might have been done for legitimate anticompetitive
justifications.'67 The K-Dur court pointed out that in a situation
where a modest cash payment enables a cash-starved generic
manufacturer to avoid bankruptcy and to begin marketing a generic
drug, a reverse payment may have an overall effect of increasing
competition in the market.' In addition, there will be a situation
where a small innovator drug company intends to conduct clinical
studies to address a new therapeutic use of its patented drug for a
long-term competitive benefit, but cannot afford the studies if a
generic version of the drug enters the market and its revenue
decreases. In such a situation, a review by a court may be
warranted as to whether the reverse payment settlement had a
justifiable pro-competitive justification for a long-term
perspective.'69
i6 VAKERICS, supra note 75, at 7-8.
165 d
16 For example, payment from an innovator to an alleged infringer may
represent a licensing fee granting the former the right to produce and market the
latter's product. Schering and Upsher included this licensing agreement in their
settlement terms to justify payment from Schering to Upsher. See K-Dur, 686
F.3d at 205-06.
16 7See id. at 218.
168 Sdo
19See Grabowski, supra note 5, at 380-82.
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By contrast to the rigid per se rule, the K-Dur approach allows
antitrust defendants to present evidence to rebut the presumption of
illegality of reverse payment settlements.'
2. The Full "Rule ofReason" Approach
The full "rule of reason" approach in a complex reverse
payment settlement case is prohibitively challenging. This
approach considers all relevant circumstances of a case, including
the merits of the underlying patent litigation, amount of the
settlement value, and the estimated profit and loss born by the
companies had the generic drug entered into the market without
delay."'
First, the full "rule of reason" analysis would consider merits
of underlying patent suits.17 2 In one suggested approach, a court
may presume a reverse payment settlement to be illegal when a
generic challenger is likely to win the patent challenge suit, and, on
the other hand, uphold a reverse payment settlement when a patent
holder is likely to win the patent challenge suit."' This approach,
however, is infeasible because it is impossible to predict the
outcome of patent litigation, which is technical and complex by
nature.'74 Moreover, the Federal Circuit has sole jurisdiction, and
170 The Sixth Circuit held that the reverse payment settlement was per se
illegal in In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig. 332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th Cir. 2003).
This case involved an atypical reverse payment settlement. Id. The settlement
had a bottlenecking effect on the drug in the patent suit, and involved an
agreement to delay the market entry of drugs other than the drug in the patent
suit. Id at 904. Therefore, the court held that the settlement was a horizontal
agreement not to compete and per se illegal. Id. at 908; see Carrier, supra note
88, at 2.
171 See supra Part II.C (discussing the full "rule of reason" antitrust analysis).
172 id.
173 See Henry N. Butler et al., Policy Reversal on Reverse Payments: Why
Courts Should Not Follow the New DOJ Position on Reverse-Payment
Settlements of Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 96 IOWA L. REV. 57, 107-08
(2010) (discussing Professor Daniel Crane's model that considers the merits of
the patent infringement suit in the antitrust analysis of reverse payment
settlements).
174 See Carrier, supra note 16, at 73; Hastings, supra note 27, at 44.
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therefore expertise, over patent suits."' Encouraging other circuit
courts to second-guess the merits of the underlying patent suits and
to base their antitrust reasoning on such assumptions may cause
inconsistent and unjust decisions, and create jurisdictional
problems.
Another reason why considering the merits of underlying
patent suits is inappropriate is because whether a reverse payment
settlement is illegal under antitrust law should not depend on the
strength of a patent. In a patent suit, there is no such thing as a
guaranteed victory: Even the holder of a strong patent has a good
chance to lose, and therefore, an incentive to settle. 176 If an
innovator and generic company choose to settle with a reverse
payment to accomplish their aligned incentive to share the
monopoly,"' they should be held to have violated the antitrust law,
regardless of the strength of the innovator's patent.
Second, the "full rule of reason" analysis would consider the
amount of the settlement value as a proxy for the legality of the
settlement. " Under this approach, if the settlement value is
greater than the amount the generic manufacturer would gain by
entering the market, the settlement will be presumptively illegal."'
If the settlement is less than the generic manufacturer's anticipated
gain by market entry, but more than its potential legal fees, the
burden will be on the antitrust plaintiff to prove patent invalidity.so
If the settlement is for less than the generic manufacturer's
potential legal fees, the settlement will be presumed valid.'"' This
approach would be impracticable because it is often difficult to
accurately estimate a generic manufacturer's anticipated market
17 Court Jurisdiction, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/court-jurisdiction.html (last
visited Nov. 27, 2012).
176 Hastings, supra note 27, at 44.
1 Id. at 53-54 (comparing a patent suit to a coin toss and showing how the
values of even strong patent suits may be diminished).
178 See supra Part II.C (discussing the full "rule of reason" antitrust analysis).
19 Andersen, supra note 20, at 1053-56.
180 Id.
181 Id.
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gains. 18 Except for cases where generic companies clearly
received more than they ever could have gained by entering the
market,' or where they clearly received less than their potential
legal fees, many cases would fall near the borderline. Establishing
bright lines to classify them into the three categories would be
challenging.
In summary, the fact-specific inquiry of full "rule of reason"
analysis, specifically in the context of complex reverse payment
settlements, is unlikely to be accurate and, when not accurate,
would result in inconsistent and unjust court decisions.'84
3. K-Dur's "Quick Look Rule of Reason" Analysis
By contrast to full "rule of reason" analysis, K-Dur's
presumptive illegality approach bypasses a prohibitively
complicated inquiry into every relevant circumstance of the case.'
It is straightforward and consistent, and saves courts from
assessing the merits or settlement value of underlying patent
suits.'8"
K-Dur's presumption of illegality is warranted because of the
extremely anticompetitive nature of a reverse payment settlement
in general. ' At the same time, the K-Dur approach has the
potential to over-punish antitrust defendants engaging in reverse
payment settlements. Theoretically, the holder of a valid patent is
entitled to market exclusivity, including reverse payment
settlements. Therefore, one could argue that the holder of a strong
patent may be over-punished by the K-Dur approach because he is
likely entitled to a monopoly deal. This argument is rebutted on
two grounds. First, the legality of reverse payment settlements
182 See id. at 1054-63.
183 See Carrier, supra note 16, at 73.
184 But see Butler, supra note 173, at 114-25 (advocating for the full "rule of
reason" analysis of reverse payment settlements because such contextual
analysis will best balance type I errors-overinclusive prosecution of
procompetitive or neutral business conduct-and type II errors-underinclusive
prosecution of anticompetitive business activities).
185 See supra Part II.C (discussing the full "rule of reason" and "quick look
rule of reason" antitrust analyses).
186 Hastings, supra note 27, at 63.
1 Carrier, supra note 123, at 90.
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should not be based on the strength of the patent.'" In a patent
suit, a strong patent does not necessarily turn out to be a valid
patent."9 Second, in the K-Dur approach, the antitrust defendants
are given an opportunity to rebut the presumption of illegality. 190
This rebuttal opportunity is critical for courts to avoid erroneously
punishing antitrust defendants who did not engage in illegal
anticompetitive activities.
Another potential limitation of the K-Dur approach is that it
may not effectively accomplish the goal of reducing
pharmaceutical costs and promoting consumer welfare. Such a
goal and a reflection on public policy are beyond the K-Dur
decision, however. The holding is that pharmaceutical reverse
payments presumptively violate antitrust law-no more, no less.
The social and economic implications of the K-Dur decision are
discussed in Part V.
For all stated reasons in this Part, the K-Dur method is the best
practicable judicial approach to reverse payment settlements.
V. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES
OF THE K-DuR DECISION
The K-Dur decision is in accord with Congressional intent
underlying the Hatch-Waxman Act to promote public welfare by
encouraging prompt market entry of generic drugs and fair
competition. 's' Judicial intervention, as in K-Dur, can be a
powerful tool to address social problems. At the same time, the
effects of judicial intervention are complex and often
unpredictable.'9 2 This Part discusses possible social and economic
consequences of the K-Dur decision and the role of Congress and
188 See supra Part IV.B.2.
189 See Hastings, supra note 27, at 44.
190 In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012).
' See H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647; Carrier, supra note 123, at 84 (discussing that reverse
payment settlements are atypical settlements "that dispose of the validity and
infringement challenges central to the Hatch-Waxman scheme").
192 Hemphill, supra note 26, at 671 & n.171.
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the federal agencies in making antitrust and patent policies to
address such consequences.
A. The Decision May Discourage Settlements ofHatch- Waxman
Patent Suits and Increase Litigation in Courts
To be sure, K-Dur does not intend to discourage settlements of
Hatch-Waxman patent challenge cases.'93 Moreover, the FTC is
unlikely to prosecute any settlements that fall under the $2 million
safe harbor.'94 Nevertheless, when companies are prohibited from
settling with large reverse payment deals, they may choose to
litigate patent challenge suits to the end, rather than to settle
without a reverse payment. This result would be against the
general judicial policy favoring settlements.'9 5
At first, a decrease in settlements and an increase in litigation
would seem to go against public interest because of the extra time
and cost required for litigation. Economic modeling, however, has
shown that settlements that include a cash payment from the
innovator to the challenger provide consumers with less economic
benefit than seeing the litigation to completion."' Specifically,
economic scholars believe that, in terms of cost borne by
consumers, the cost of reverse payment settlements is greater than
193 K-Dur specifically aims to eliminate accompanying reverse payment deals.
K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 216. A patent holder is still encouraged to settle the patent
challenge, allowing a generic challenger to enter the market at any point earlier
than the patent expiration date. See id.
194 Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 135 F.T.C. 444, 496
(2003); Kenneth L. Glazer et al., Third Circuit Sides with FTC Position on So-
Called Pay-for-Delay Settlements, Virtually Guaranteeing Supreme Court
Review on the Issue, K&L GATES (July 25, 2012), http://www.klgates.com/third-
circuit-sides-with-ftc-position-on-so-called-pay-for-delay-settlements-virtually-
guaranteeing-supreme-court-review-on-the-issue-07-25-2012/.
195 K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 216.
196 Hemphill, supra note 132, at 1572 n.81 (citing Jeremy Bulow, The Gaming
of Pharmaceutical Patents, 4 INNOVATION POL'Y & ECON. 145, 159-73 (2004);
Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 RAND J. ECON. 391,
407-08 (2003)). A mathematical model demonstrates that consumers
economically benefit more from litigation than reverse payment settlements.
See Hemphill, supra note 132, at 1591-93.
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that of full litigation expenses.19 7 The scholars point out that a
settlement undermines subsequent generic challengers' incentive to
challenge a patent, thereby harming consumers.198 Therefore, an
increase in litigation would actually be beneficial to consumers in
this context.
B. The Decision May Discourage Potential Generic
Manufacturers To Bring Patent Challenge Litigation
When settlements with lucrative reverse payment deals are
prohibited, some potential generic manufacturers might be
discouraged from bringing patent challenge suits and marketing
generic drugs.'" This outcome would counter the Congressional
intent underlying the Hatch-Waxman Act, which was to encourage
potential generic manufacturers to bring patent challenges and to
produce generic versions of drugs.200 At the same time, however, a
ban on reverse payments may incentivize generic manufacturers to
be selective in bringing patent challenges.2 0 ' The system where a
generic manufacturer could capture profit by entering into a
reverse payment settlement incentivizes generic manufacturers to
challenge valuable patents, not weak patents, to obtain good
reverse payment deals.202 If the K-Dur decision alleviates the
burden on innovative drug companies to defend many frivolous
patent challenges by encouraging generic challengers to become
more selective in bringing suits against weak patents, this would
benefit consumers by reducing the cost of pharmaceutical
litigation, which would eventually lower pharmaceutical market
prices.
197 Hemphill, supra note 132, at 1572 & n.81.
198 Id
199 Id. at 1575 (suggesting that a ban on reverse payment settlements would
reduce challengers' settlement options and incentive to challenge patents,
thereby reducing competition).
2oo H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2647, 2647.
201 See Hastings, supra note 27, at 34.202 id.
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C. K-Dur May Not Effectively Eliminate Reverse Payment
Settlements
It remains unclear whether the K-Dur decision will effectively
eliminate reverse payment settlements. First, until the Supreme
Court potentially clarifies the issue, the stark circuit split may
result in forum shopping by litigating parties.20 Pharmaceutical
companies are typically multi-state corporations that are subject to
personal jurisdiction in multiple states and federal districts.
203 Given the stark circuit split created by K-Dur decision, the issue may be
ripe for review by the United States Supreme Court. The Solicitor General, at
the request of the FTC, has petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari
in another pharmaceutical reverse payment settlement case, Fed. Trade Comm'n
v. Watson Pharm., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012), on October 4, 2012. Petition
for Writ of Certiorari for Plaintiff-Appellant, Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Watson
Pharm., Inc., No. 12-416 (U.S. Oct. 4, 2012), 2012 WL 4750283. As for K-Dur,
both Merck (the named defendant which acquired Schering after the fact at
issue, see supra note 97) and Upsher separately petitioned the Supreme Court
for a writ of certiorari in August 2012. Petition for Writ of Certiorari for
Defendant-Appellant, Upsher-Smith Labs., Inc. v. La. Wholesale Drug Co., No.
12-265 (U.S. Aug. 30, 2012); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Merck & Co. v. La.
Wholesale Drug Co., No. 12-245 (U.S. Aug. 24, 2012). In addition, BayerAG,
the New York Intellectual Law Association, and the Pharmaceutical Research
and Manufacturers of America ("PhRMA") filed amicus briefs respectively.
Amici Bayer AG & Bayer Corp.'s Brief in Support of Petitioners, Merck & Co.
v. La. Wholesale Drug Co., No. 12-245 (U.S. Sept. 24, 2012); Amici Bayer AG
& Bayer Corp.'s Brief in Support of Petitioners, Upsher-Smith Labs., Inc. v. La.
Wholesale Drug Co., No. 12-265 (U.S. Sept. 24 2012); Brief of Amicus Curiae
N.Y. Intellectual Property Law Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, Merck & Co. v. La. Wholesale Drug Co., No. 12-245 (U.S. Sept. 24,
2012); Brief of Amicus Curiae N.Y. Intellectual Property Law Ass'n as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Upsher-Smith Labs., Inc. v. La. Wholesale
Drug Co., No. 12-265, (U.S. Sept. 24, 2012); Brief for Pharm. Research and
Mfrs. of Am. (PhRMA) as Amicus Curiae In Support of Petitioner, Merck &
Co. v. La. Wholesale Drug Co., No. 12-245 (U.S. Sept. 24, 2012). The petition
for a writ of certiorari for Watson was granted on December 7, 2012. Docket for
No. 12-416, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, http://www.supremecourt.
gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/12-416.htm (last visited Dec. 16,
2012). The petition for a writ of certiorari for K-Dur is pending at the Supreme
Court as of December 16, 2012. Docket for No. 12-456, SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/d
ocketfiles/12-245.htm (last visited Dec. 16, 2012).
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Second, even after the official ban of reverse payment
settlements by the K-Dur decision, pharmaceutical companies may
continue to make anticompetitive deals by hiding reverse payments
in a series of complex transactions. For example, in K-Dur,
Schering paid to Upsher for an apparent licensing agreement to
make and sell Upsher's products. 204 The FTC and antitrust
plaintiffs alleged that this payment was a disguised reverse
payment because the delayed market entry of Upsher's generic
version of K-Dur 20 was a part of consideration for Schering's
payment.205 In addition, the licensing agreement was abandoned
after the settlement, supporting the notion of disguise. 206 Another
example of side deals involves Solvay. 207 Solvay settled patent
litigation on its innovative drug, AndroGel, with generic
manufacturers. 20 8 As a side deal to the settlement, Solvay paid one
generic manufacturer for backup manufacturing, even though the
latter did not manufacture the drug; Solvay paid another generic
manufacturer for co-promotion that far exceeded the market rate.209
As companies attempt to disguise reverse payments, unwinding
complex transactions and tracking down evidence of reverse
payment settlements would become a more burdensome and
challenging task for the FTC and the courts.210
D. The K-Dur Decision May Be Applied to a Wider Context
Beyond Pharmaceutical Reverse Payment Settlements
"Antitrust analysis must sensitively recognize and reflect the
distinctive economic and legal setting of the regulated industry to
204 In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 205-06 (3d Cir. 2012).
205 Id
206 Id
207 Carrier, supra note 123, at 94.
208 id
209 id
210 Kenneth Glazer & Jende Desmond-Harris, Reverse Payments: Hard Case
Even Under Good Law, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Spring 2010, AT 14, 18-19 (2010),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/ant
itrustsource/glazer desmondharris Anti Spring20104.authcheckdam.pdf.
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which it applies." 2 11 In the K-Dur decision, the court cautioned that
"our decision today is limited to reverse payments between patent
holders and would be generic competitors in the pharmaceutical
industry." 2 12 Just as the court was concerned, this approach of
presuming that any cash flow from the patent holder to the
challenger in a settlement of a patent suit is unreasonable and
illegal may possibly be "borrowed" and applied in a wider context
beyond Hatch-Waxman patent challenge suits-for example,
patent litigation in cell phone industries. Limitless application of
the K-Dur decision without attention to specific nature of the
industry would undermine the significance of patents and
innovation.2 13
E. Antitrust and Patent Rulemaking By Congress and the Federal
Agencies
Congress and federal agencies, such as the FTC and the FDA,
are in the best position in directing policies following the K-Dur.
A court is limited in its capacity to establish policies based on
aggregate data. 214 By contrast, Congress and federal agencies are
capable of developing an optimal rule by independently collecting
the relevant information. 215 Congress has, in fact, recently
considered new legislation to regulate reverse payment settlements.
For example, a proposed Senate bill of 2009 ("Senate Bill 369"1)216
would treat agreements by which generic manufacturers
"receive[d] anything of value" in exchange for "agreeing not to
research, develop, manufacture, market, or sale" as presumptively
anticompetitive.2 17 Settling parties may rebut the presumption by
211 Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540
U.S. 398, 411-12 (2004) (quoting Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17,
22 (1st Cir. 1990) (Breyer, C.) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
212 In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 216 (3d Cir. 2012).
213 See Day, supra note 31, at 257-61 (advocating that patent law promotes
long-term consumer welfare by incentivizing innovation).
214 See Hemphill, supra note 26, at 671 (discussing the nature of a court as a
fact-finder of each case).
215 Id.
216 Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 369, 111th Cong. (2009).
217 Substitute Amendment to S. 369, 111th Cong. § 28(a)(2)(A) (2009).
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demonstrating the agreement's procompetitive effects.2 18 This bill
proposes an approach to reverse payment settlements similar to the
K-Dur.2 19
Another Senate bill of 2009 ("Senate Bill 1315"1)221 seeks to
maintain a strong incentive for generic drug manufacturers to enter
the market by expanding eligibility of the 180-day market
exclusivity period.2 2' Specifically, the bill would award the market
exclusivity period not only to the first ANDA filer with a
paragraph IV certification (as the current legislation does) but also
to (1) the first challenger to win a court decision in the patent
challenge suit; and (2) an ANDA filer that was not sued for
infringement, provided that no other generic manufacturer has
begun marketing the drug.222 This amendment would incentivize
generic manufacturers to challenge a patent, win in court, and
actually market the drug, even after the first-filer has settled with
the patent holder.223
An alternative option would be to allow reverse payment
settlements without antitrust scrutiny, but upon finding of a reverse
payment settlement, to transfer exclusivity from the settling
generic manufacturer to the next ANDA filer. 224 This option and
Senate Bill 1315 would both allow reverse payment settlements to
occur, but would reduce their potential to be anticompetitive by
maintaining strong incentives for other generic manufacturers to
enter the market.2 25
Regulatory and judicial "gaming" by pharmaceutical
companies would continue. Congress and the FTC are in the best
2181d. § 28(a)(2)(B).
219 On the other hand, the House version of legislation would prohibit such
agreements across the board. H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 2573 (2009). This is
similar to the per se approach and may be overinclusive. See Carrier, supra note
123, at 95; supra Part IV.B.1.
22o Drug Price Competition Act, S. 1315, 111th Cong. (2009).
221 id
222 Id. § 2(a)(1)(B)(III)(bb).
223 See Butler et al., supra note 173, at 122-23; Carrier, supra note 123, at
100-03.
224 See Butler et al., supra note 173, at 124.
225 Id. at 122-24; Carrier, supra note 123, at 100-03.
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position to oversee reverse payment settlements post K-Dur and to
take on the challenging task of implementing policies that would
best balance innovation and competition for consumers' benefit.
VI. CONCLUSION
The K-Dur decision replaced the unlimited protection of
reverse payment settlements under the SOP test with a "quick look
rule of reason" antitrust scrutiny and presumed that reverse
payment settlements are illegal.226 The SOP test is problematic
because (1) its presumption of patent validity is not always
warranted and (2) its deference to patent holders permit
economically alarming monopoly shared between innovative and
generic pharmaceutical companies through reverse payment
settlements. Settling long, expensive, and unpredictable patent
challenge cases offers advantages to both parties even without
reverse payments. Reverse payment agreements typically seem to
be optional deals at the cost of consumers, and warrant antitrust
scrutiny.
Holding reverse payment settlements per se illegal, however,
would be overinclusive. On the other hand, the full "rule of
reason" analysis is theoretically ideal in minimizing overinclusive
and underinclusive errors, by weighing all relevant facts, including
the merits of the underlying patent challenge case, settlement
value, market power, financial ability of settling parties, and side
deals. This approach, however, would be practically challenging.
It would be complex, costly, and time-consuming, and would result
in inaccurate and inconsistent decisions. Additionally,
unpredictability and nontransparency of the outcome of the "full
rule of reason" analysis will leave the industry and consumers in
confusion. By contrast, K-Dur's presumption of illegality
approach is straightforward and saves the court from analysis of
prohibitively complex facts, while allowing antitrust defendants to
demonstrate pro-competitive benefits of the agreement and rebut
the presumption of unreasonable restraint on trade. Therefore, the
226 In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig. 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012).
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K-Dur decision offers the best practicable judicial approach to
reverse payment settlements.
The pharmaceutical industry's regulatory and judicial gaming
will continue. The K-Dur decision, however, is a positive step
toward facilitating consumer's access to affordable generic drugs
under antitrust law, while continuing to protect pharmaceutical
companies' incentive to develop innovative drugs under patent
law. Public interest in a fair competitive market and innovative
drug development must be balanced and furthered by Congress and
the federal agencies, such as the FDA and the FTC, through the
pharmaceutical antitrust and patent policy-making.
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